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This is anOpeAbstract – Sahelian pastoralists use mobility, diversiﬁcation, and even pluriactivity as main adaptation
strategies to the asymmetrical distribution of multifaceted resources. Complex relations vis-à-vis this risky
environment hide slowing transitions from a traditional inward-looking to an outward-looking economy,
which is characterised by increasing use of a remunerated workforce. The growing commodiﬁcation of the
economy of Sahelian pastoralists could generate new forms of uncertainty. The authors of this paper use a
principal-agent model to analyse the remunerated workforce and demonstrate the mixed results of this
strategy in the context of structural risk in the Sahel. The authors then highlight the conditions under which
trust and reputation are developed to stabilise employment relations and better cope with and/or mitigate
various shocks.
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Résumé – La sécurisation des activités pastorales au Sahel à travers le recours à la main-d’œuvre
rémunérée : l’ambivalence de la marchandisation. Les pasteurs sahéliens utilisent la mobilité, la
diversiﬁcation, voire la pluriactivité comme principales stratégies d’adaptation face à la distribution
asymétrique de ressources multiples. La complexité des interactions avec cet environnement risqué cache
des transitions progressives d’une économie centrée sur les ressources familiales vers une économie plus
ouverte à travers un recours croissant à de la main-d’œuvre salariée. Cette marchandisation accrue peut
générer de nouvelles formes d’incertitudes. Cette contribution utilise un modèle principal-agent pour
analyser le recours à de la main-d’œuvre salariée et montrer l’ambivalence de cette stratégie dans le contexte
de risques structurels du Sahel. Elle décrit ensuite les modalités de production de conﬁance et de réputation
pour stabiliser les relations salariales et faire face à ces incertitudes.
Mots clés : pastoralisme / risque / main-d’œuvre salariée / marchandisation / Sahel1 Introduction
Hazards are ubiquitous in the lives of most people, notably
in those of farmers in developing countries, who must act to
secure their livelihoods and minimise losses. Those with weak
assets are usually pushed to engage in low return and
sometimes risky nonfarming activities (Barrett et al., 2001),
whereas for others more endowed or living in regions with
favourable alternative activities, the impetus to raise incomes
and accumulate wealth prevails (Loison and Loison, 2016).
Sometimes they adopt the rearing of short cycle species (sheepding author: awane@cirad.fr
nAccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsA
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction inand goats), which provides fast gains to escape poverty (Alary
et al., 2015). Sahelian pastoralists are facing increasing shocks,
constraints and risks. They lack contingent markets for their
produce, which affects their livelihoods severely. They are
gradually adapting to these conditions by using mobility and
diversiﬁcation/multifunctionality strategies to enhance pro-
duction and secure their livelihoods (Alary et al., 2015). These
strategies are characterised by complex relations that limit
multi-level strategies, including the use of remunerated
workers, thus overtaking the delegation of tasks usually
handled at the family level.
The use of remunerated employees is meant to complement
cattle herding and mobility while developing and improving
remunerated workforce relations and also to support on-goingttribution License CC-BY-NC (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0),
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 1. Livestock risk assessment in Senegal and risk prioritisation in the Ferlo region.
Tableau . Évaluation des risques dans le secteur de l’élevage au Sénégal et priorisation au Ferlo.
Risks related to Worse-case scenario Average frequency Average annual losses Score1 Ferlo’s risk prioritization
Bush ﬁres Very signiﬁcant Very signiﬁcant Very signiﬁcant 5 High
Animal health Very signiﬁcant Signiﬁcant Very signiﬁcant 4.6 Average
Rainfall Very signiﬁcant Medium Signiﬁcant 3.84 Average
The market Low Signiﬁcant Low 2.62 Average
Conﬂicts Medium Very low Low 1.81 High
Plagues of locusts Very low Very low Low 1.31 Weak
Source: Wane and Mballo (2016).
1 Risk scores are based on the evaluation of the frequency and severity of risks, then ranked in order of signiﬁcance:
Score risk = 0.75 (Average losses frequency)^0.5þ 0.25Severe losses.
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increased commodiﬁcation of social relations and practices in
pastoral areas. Commodiﬁcation should be neutral in terms of
emerging uncertainties as the payment of a ﬁxed salary seems
to be the best option for all stakeholders involved in the
transaction. However, information asymmetry among stake-
holders is common and can be a source of moral hazard
because efforts from the players’ transactions are endogenous,
but adverse selection may also arise. In such cases, in-depth
investigations should be conducted to determine how Sahelian
pastoral settlements manage remunerated employees in a
context of inaccurate information and especially in a context of
increased commodiﬁcation of pastoral activities.
The authors of this paper analyse the pre-conditions for the
development of trust and reputation (Tirole, 1996; Gergaud
et al., 2012), without which cooperative strategies would be
difﬁcult to implement, as prominently expressed in the Kreps-
Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson model (Kreps et al., 1982).
Section 2 describes the study area and shows the nature of
the risks pastoralists are facing. Section 3 relies heavily on
previous studies conducted and published in 2009 and 2010 to
recall the explanatory factors of the use of a remunerated
workforce in the Senegalese Sahel before pointing out an
emerging research question concerning the mixed results of
this strategy. In Section 4, the authors elaborate on the
theoretical modelling and explain the methodological ap-
proach used to address emerging issues of employment
relations in Sahelian pastoral regions. Section 5 describes the
conditions for production of trust and reputation that cement
employment relations in the Sahelian pastoral areas.
A conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 Study area and risk assessment
The Ferlo is the main pastoral farming zone in Senegal,
which covers a vast area of 67 610 km2. It faces erratic rainfall,
with annual averages below 200mm in the north and above
550mm in the south. Pastoral farming is the principal mode of
economic valuation in these arid areas, and livestock keepers
are operating in a context of risk. Mobility is gradually being
recognized as an adaptation to environmental conditions, and it
also facilitates the securing of livestock and encourages the
increased use of hired labour. Pastoral households in the Ferlo
attach high value to animal production management. TheyPage 2commit 98% of their time to herd management (through
watering, milking and transhumance), and the rest of their time
is spent on other ad hoc tasks (such as salt curing meat) (Wane
et al., 2009).
Risk assessment and prioritisation conducted on behalf an
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
survey (Wane and Mballo, 2016) showed that the main risks in
the Senegalese Sahel are related to conﬂicts and bush ﬁres,
whereas those related to animal diseases, rainfall as well as
livestock and commodity market have average impacts (Tab.
1). However, this computable risk approach could be
differently perceived by pastoralists who are usually acting
in uncertainty.
3 Preliminary ﬁndings on a remunerated
workforce in Ferlo and emerging research
question
As described by Wane et al. (2009, 2010), the quantitative
data gathered for this research came from existing databases
collected between June 2006 and June 2007 using question-
naires on a subset of 149 pastoral encampments from ﬁve sites
(Boulal, Keur Momar Sarr, Niassanté, Tatki and Thieul). A
pastoral encampment is a large unit of residence grouping one
or more households.
Results show that 25% of pastoral settlements declare that
they use a remunerated workforce. These ﬁndings contribute to
the revision of the idea that Sahelian pastoralism is an
economic activity based solely on family labour. In these
pastoral farms, production and sales decisions are often
disconnected from market imperatives. Therefore, the use of
remunerated labour stems from multiple trade-offs between
internal work organisation, family activities and livestock-
based income (Tab. 2).
The authors applied a logistic regression model to the data,
the ﬁndings of which revealed that the use of remunerated
labour is negatively determined by the number of households
in the encampments (very signiﬁcant at 1%) and the labour
transfer rate (the ratio between the number of encampment
members declaring remunerated external activities and the
total population; very signiﬁcant at 5%). In addition, it is
positively inﬂuenced by the number of sheep in the herd, so
that their management quickly becomes time-consuming (very
signiﬁcant at 1%), the number of women living in theof 6
Table 2. Determinants of pastoral wage labor in the Ferlo (Wane et al., 2010).
Tableau . Déterminants du recours à la main-d’œuvre salariée au Ferlo (Wane et al., 2010).
Variables B E.S. Exp(B) Odd ratios
[Exp(B) 1] 100 (%)
Nagelkerke’s
pseudo R-squared (%)
“Gender” model Household
*** 0.476 0.171 0.621 37.9 42.0
Woman** 0.123 0.061 1.131 13.1
Labor transfer*** 2.975 1.146 0.051 94.9
Cattle** 0.012 0.006 1.012 1.2
Sheep*** 0.009 0.003 1.009 0.9
Constant 3.042 2.228 20.956 –
“Age group” model Household*** 0.494 0.182 0.610 39.0 42.4
Third Age* 0.309 0.168 1.362 36.2
Cattle** 0.014 0.006 1.014 1.4
Sheep*** 0.008 0.003 1.008 0.8
Labor transfer *** 3.213 1.177 0.040 96.0
Constant 3.719 2.274 41.222 –
The Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-squared, adjusted version of Cox & Snell’s pseudo R-squared, is more relevant in our case.
Non-signiﬁcant variables are not shown in this table.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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aged over 50 years living in the encampment (very signiﬁcant
at 10%).
During the dry season in the arid Ferlo, pastoral households
hire seasonal or permanent labour for transhumance. The
number of employees hired depends on the herd size; large
livestock keepers employ many employees (69%) and have a
lower labour transfer rate (9%) because they have enough
ﬁnancial resources to own large herds and hire many
employees. Conversely, small livestock producers have
insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to own large herds and
remunerate employees. There is high labour loss in this last
category (a labour transfer rate of 33%). In the intermediate
categories of ‘large livestock keepers’ and ‘medium livestock
keepers’, the situation is mixed. There is a need for livestock
producers to seize opportunities in the region and earn a decent
income from the production of animals.
Almost 87% of respondents identiﬁed (1) technical factors
(of herd composition in terms of species and herd management)
and (2) individual aspirations as factors motivating them to use
remunerated labour. Another factor inﬂuencing the recourse to
remunerated labour includes land use; 54%of employers cite the
use of a remunerated workforce to prevent neighbourhood
conﬂicts. In the southern Ferlo, in agropastoral sites such as
Boulal and Thiel, nearly 81% of employers declare that use of
remunerated labour frees up time for other income generation
activities. Economic diversiﬁcation is mainly in the form of
trading, particularly in the site of Boulal, which is very close to
the larger livestock market (Dahra), and in the site of Thiel,
which is closer to the Groundnut Basin.
However, the use of remunerated labour is itself a source of
uncertainty that producers are trying to reduce. In the informal
context of Ferlo, this strategy contributes to the increased
commodiﬁcation of social transactions and is also a source of
new uncertainties.Page 34 Theoretical framework and
methodological approach for addressing the
emerging research question
Sahelian pastoral households still pursue a composite
utility function that balances their short-term consumption
needs and long-term herd building strategies to meet future
consumption needs (Fadiga, 2013). Pastoralists are not
systematically monetary-oriented. The use of a remunerated
workforce is common in Sahelian pastoral areas and their
issues could be addressed by the principal-agent approach to
explain the relations between employers (pastoralists) and
employees (shepherds).
4.1 A basic principal-agent model as an analytical
framework
In the principal-agent relationship, an economically depen-
dent entity, referred to as the agent,manages the assets of another
economically strong entity called the principal. The principal
must provide compensation without having accurate informa-
tion about the agent’s efforts (Mirrlees and Raimondo, 2013).
Thismodel is basedon the inﬂuential contribution ofHolmström
and Milgrom (1991), and its empirical implications in socio-
economic transactions are wide ranging. Although game theory
tools in principal-agent modelling have led to sophisticated
mathematicaldevelopments (Mirrlees andRaimondo,2013), the
authors of this paper have simpliﬁed the approach to the greatest
possible extent, with results quite similar to those of Debraj
(2012) and Corgnet et al. (2016).
ConsiderQ as the production level expected by both parties
and e the level of effort ei ∈ {0, 1} exerted at a certain cost that
inﬂuences the ﬁnal output. For the principal, it is possible to
have a low outputQfwhen the agent provides low level of effortof 6
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(e= 1). The production Q depends on the agent’s effort. It will
be high enough to reach Pe when the agent provides great
effort or low pf= 1 pe when he provides weak or no effort
0< pf< pe< 1.
Q ¼ Qf if e ¼ 0 and p ¼ pf
Q ¼ Qe if e ¼ 1 and p ¼ pe:
ð1Þ
Effort production is not ﬁnancially neutral for the agent;
this cost C ¼ CfCe
n
is both linked to the intrinsic effort level and
incentives designed by the principal. It should be noted that the
term ‘incentives’ could cover anything from a monetary
payment against a measurable outcome to a reward (not only in
monetary terms) against a measurable effort.
Thus, the agent utility depends on the wage level and the
efforts made. Two conditions could inﬂuence this utility:– a situation of ﬁxed salary uðwÞC
e
uðwÞCf
n– a situation of variable salary according to the efforts made
by the agent: uðweÞC
e
uðwf ÞCf
nThus, how does one develop a contract with an optimum
salary level to ensure the highest level of effort is provided by
the agent?
The principal who aims at an effective control of scarce
resources and production activities will offer incentives to
inﬂuence the behaviour of the agent. Before hiring an agent,
the principal must manage two constraints:
– a participation constraint (or individual rationality as
notiﬁed by Varian, 2014): The agent must work before
payment. This constraint ensures the agent’s reservation
utility (equivalent to what could give him another
opportunity), and if there is another contractual option
enabling the agent to obtain a utility u (a), the principal
must label the contract as follows:
peuðweÞþð1peÞuðwf ÞCe ≥ uðaÞ
uðwÞCe ≥ uðaÞ
n
(2)– an incentive compatibility constraint (or self-selection as
stipulated by Varian, 2014), which says that the agent must
receive a higher utility from exerting effort than for not
doing so, as follows:
peuðweÞþð1peÞuðwf ÞCe ≥ pf uðweÞþð1pf Þuðwf ÞCf
uðwÞCe ≥ uðwÞCf
n
¼¼> ½uðweÞuðwf Þðpepf Þ≥CeCfCe ≥Cf
n
(3)It is assumed that the agent is risk averse. Therefore, living
under risk and random income, the agent’s expected utility is
lower than it would have been if he received a guaranteed
income. The principal is risk neutral. He aims to design a
contract that maximises his expected monetary or non-
monetary return. The principal will also manage two problems:
– a hidden information problem, such as when the principal
is unable to get information on whether the employee is
skilled or not prior to hiring;– a hidden action problem or moral hazard, which is a
recurrent issue in ﬁxed-salary contracts because the level ofPage 4 of 6effort required is not perfectly observable in advance by the
principal.Thus, the principal could elaborate a contract by assessing
two possibilities:
– the case in which efforts made by the agent are observable
(ﬁrst-best contract) either directly by the principal or
indirectly by a third party remunerated by the principal.
The optimal contract would ensure a guaranteed payment
w covering the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints of the agent;– the case in which efforts made by the agent are not
observable (second-best contract). The principal considers
a payment adjusted to the agent’s effort. The dilemma
would be to ﬁnd a value between high payment we if the
deliverable is satisfactory and lower payment wf if the
deliverable is not satisfactory to optimise the expected
results while respecting the participation and incentive
compatibility constraints of the agent.In principal-agent transactions, the gains expected by the
principal depend on the agent’s actions and efforts to achieve
the expected results. The agent’s effort is key in principal-
agent transactions, and many theoretical contributions have
analysed which incentives motivate the agent to provide efforts
adequate for a given production level (Holmström and
Milgrom, 1991). Although the agent’s efforts are positively
correlated with the ﬁnal outputs, the occurrence of random
exogenous shocks affects the agent’s efforts to achieve the
expected results (Rubin and Sheremeta, 2015). These studies
have also examined the best way to design an optimal contract
in an inaccurate information situation, but only a few of them
have analysed income related to the presence of hazards and
resulting from the agent’s efforts (Rubin and Sheremeta,
2015).
Moreover, economic agents could be selﬁsh and motivated
by the pursuit of personal interests. As a result, the contracting
parties reciprocate this type of behaviour. Empirical studies
have incorporated this form of positive and negative
reciprocity by using game theory. Other empirical surveys
show that 40 to 60% of individuals in contractual transactions
make reciprocally beneﬁcial choices, whereas 20 to 30%
behave purely selﬁshly (Fehr et al., 2007).
This paper mainly describes a static approach to the
principal-agent models based on ﬁrst-order solutions that
could appear limited in their ability to provide more widely
applicable economic solutions. However, dynamic
approaches, although desirable, pose important technical
challenges as bilevel optimisation problems (participation
and incentive constraints). Recent research contributions have
attempted to address the agent’s optimisation problems by
extending polynomial approaches for static principal-agent
models to dynamic models (Renner and Schmedders, 2015).
Recruitment is primarily based on the reputation of the
employee. Individuals invest in building good reputations for
themselves, since they know they will be trusted in the future if
they keep a clean record now. Reputation should be understood
both individually and collectively, as stated by Tirole (1996)
and empirically observed by Gergaud et al. (2012). Thus, an
A. Wane et al.: Cah. Agric. 2018, 27, 35006individual may increase his level of effort to meet the
standards of a collective reputation developed by former and
existing community members. Therefore, individual effort
level is also linked to the past behaviours of other members
of the community. In addition, agent behaviours can be
inﬂuenced by collective beliefs and socio-cultural practices
(Tirole, 1996).
After recruitment, production uncertainties can emanate
from the quality of production and employee behaviour. Thus,
the stability of employment relations can also depend on the
level of trust between employer and employee. Trust, often put
forward by employers, is not spontaneously acquired but rather
generated by individual motivations to maintain a reputation.
By tracking the conditions of trust implementation, Reynaud
(1998) emphasised a radical cleavage between approaches to
cultivating conﬁdence in terms of cumulative capital and in
terms of immaterial trust.
5 Trust and reputation building processes
in the context of commodiﬁcation in the
Sahel
In the Sahelian context, a breeder (the principal) recruits a
shepherd (the agent) for herd management during the lean
season, and sometimes in the rainy season, to control animals
and prevent them from grazing in crop areas. This recruitment
results in a predetermined wage remunerated according to the
conditions of a gentleman’s agreement between the contracting
parties, made in the presence of witnesses.
5.1 Participation and incentive compatibility
constraints
The participation constraint of the shepherd seems to be
very low or even zero in Ferlo because labour supply is strong,
and shepherds have a strong desire to increase their own herd
by buying animals with gained wages.
In terms of incentive compatibility constraints, shepherd
recruitment is built around a service in return for an in-kind
contribution (a predetermined number of small ruminants to
exchange and/or a certain amount of milk, as well as
coverage of food and clothing expenditures) to encourage
shepherds to manage animals effectively in a challenging
environment characterised by scarce resources. However,
monetisation in the form of a ﬁxed salary complicates this
constraint, as other incentives are required to avoid agent
modulation of efforts. When agents are provided with a
salary (rather than rewarded with the immediate fruits of
their labor), they are more likely to search for (and ﬁnd)
ways to exert less effort while still achieving the same level
of monetary compensation
5.2 Management of non-observable efforts
The average monthly wage is 17 389 FCFA (minimum
8000, maximum 24 000 – 1 $ = 555 FCFA). The remuneration
is monthly for over 72% of respondent employees. For 28% of
them, it is done on an annual basis and often in-kind for others,
with the employer agreeing at the beginning of the contract toPage 5provide the employee with a predetermined number of animals
(Wane et al., 2009). The establishment of a speciﬁc agreement
based on the payment of a ﬁxed salary in pastoral areas is likely
to lead to further uncertainty and destabilisation of trust
surrounding traditional forms of work. Therefore, the approach
developed by Salais (1989) remains based on commodity
production and might be partially applicable in the extensive
farming systems of the Ferlo, where production is not fully
developed, immediate or solely intended for the market (Wane
et al., 2009). Breeders in the Ferlo manage shepherds’ efforts
through a form of assessment based on endogenous
knowledge. They make daily observations of the herd before
and after grazing to monitor weight loss, milk production and
animal behaviour (e.g., restless, quiet) and control daily
employee behaviour (rigor at work and in social relations). In
addition, breeders also randomly visit the shepherd during
transhumance to monitor and evaluate shepherds’ efforts and
behaviour.
Breeders manage uncertainty surrounding the equivalence
between future work and wages by building conditions that
generate trust and reputation.5.3 Conditions for the production of trust and
reputation
5.3.1 Reputation-based recruitment: geographical
proximity and ethnicity criteria
Recruitments in the Ferlo region are based on locality and
ethnicity. Employers enjoy high levels of trust and conﬁdence
with employees with whom they share the same locality and
ethnic group. On average, 78% of employers hire Fulani
employees, and 41% of them hire from their own ethnic group.
Boulal, the region near the regional capital city of Dahra,
revealed a higher percentage of these cases (83% of employees
share a locality and ethnic group with their employers, and
67% of employees are from the same ethnic group as their
employers). Employers rely on these signals to better manage
recruitment-related hazards. The common ethnic group
combined to religious belonging could play an important role
in stabilizing social relationships as already observed in other
areas (Greif, 1989).5.3.2 Employer-employee relations
The relationships between employers and employees help
establish and nurture trust. The employee is generally regarded
as a family member of the employer who receives from the
employer the resources required to meet its basic needs (food,
shelter and clothing). This combination of monetary and non-
monetary remuneration depends on the employee’s status.
Employees categorised as gaynako have more stable and
sustainable employment contracts than sourga and saardi
employees. Compensation for the latter two types of
employees remains highly uncertain and highly subject to
the intrinsic functioning rhythms of farming operations.
Sahelian pastoralists are aware of exogenous shocks and
the diverse nature of shepherds’ uncertainties; thus, breeders
protect herds against the risks posed by these shocks, as well as
those posed by shepherd behaviour.of 6
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Breeders in the Ferlo seek to reduce risks induced by the
delegation of tasks by seeking conﬁdence factors (recruitment in
the ethnic sphere, even geographical and fractional recruitment),
monitoring the level of effort of the employee (accompaniment
by a family member) and controlling results (daily observations
based on a proven system of traditional knowledge). Growing
commodiﬁcation to remunerate the workforce must also reduce
asymmetries in employment relations, even if employers
commonly use endogenous knowledge to implement trust and
reputation buildingprocess and copewith uncertainties.How far
do the pastoralists have to go to secure herd management using
the labour of people hired fromother families and communities?
Moreover, examination of the use of a remunerated
workforce in Sahelian pastoral areas will illuminate the
evolution of agricultural work and family farms. However,
there is an obvious need to address these salary relationships
by using a more dynamic model that takes into consideration
the repeated actions and collects relevant data for this purpose.
This would facilitate the exploration of a more stimulating
perspective on the emerging question of wage labour in the
primary sector of Sahelian pastoralism and, more broadly, its
contribution to youth employment.
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